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The Good Old Rule, the Catspaw and aT wo-Headed Baby It is not hard to think of the legal fable, or fables of the law, in the realms of the metaphorical or the allusory,whose relationship with forms and conduct of law might seem decidedlyf abulous.E arlier in this collection, in tracing the ways in which lawm ight fable, Il eft ac rumb or two behind, presaging ac asew hich illustrates just how law fables,inwhich fablingand the fabular feature. Inow pick up thosecrumbs, and bringthis fabled case that is fabled and fabulous into the realm of the legal fable, to reveal lawf abled and fabular,i nw hich the law's savoir faire might just be revealeda st he "faire" savoir.¹ Ands ot of able, and in doing so, to reveal fabulose lawt hat is far moref abulous than might ever be imagined.
Am onstrous birth
In 1908, onlyseven years after Australia became anation, and ashort five years after it was itself established, the HighC ourt of Australia reached its decision in the caseo fDoodewardvSpence,² thatw ent on to become af oundational case throughout the common laww orld.³ It has been used as good authority in areas of lawr anging from new technologies in medicine,t ot he ownership of human remains.B efore Is peak much more of the case, Is tart by taking youtothe waythe case is read through the eyes of acommon lawyer,asstanding for the principle that therec an be no property in ab ody -except if skill and labour are exerted,inaclassicalLockean conception of property.Ihave intentionallyl eft out anything to explain the case, the words in italics forming the principle that the case is said to represent,inmuch the sameway that the moral of a fable exists without its narrative.This theatricalization is to meant to leave you bewildered, to enact the experienceo flaw as bare principle in order to appreciate how easilylegal fablingoccurs when lawyers rely on principle alone,and ignore the case and its circumstances, through three entirelyr andom, contempo-rary examples. Firstly, ap iece of scholarship. Prue Vines (correctly) makes the point that the casei so fteni ncorrectlyd escribed as standing for principle that there is no property in ab ody, that: "in fact the High Court of Australia held that this particular baby could be regarded as property because it had been preserved with care and skill."⁴ In fact,one judge said that if therehad been a "lawful exercise of work or skill,"⁵ then the bodyacquires attributes that differentiate it from amere corpse, which would then be subject to aright of possession.⁶ But care and skill?N ot so much: "some-perhaps not much-worka nd skill had been bestowed […] upon it."⁷ Secondlyapolicy document.The Australian LawReform Commission, in a2 003 report on the protection of human genetic information, included the following as as et of rules thata re used in practice, based on the case:⁸ Under existinglaw,two elements arer equiredf or as ample to become property under this rule. First,the organisation or person usingthe tissue must have lawful authority to do so, such as ahospital has in relation to tissue takenfor therapeutic purposes.Second, that organisation must applysome work or skill to the preservation of the sample. If both requirements ares atisfied, the sample mayb et reateda sp roperty of the organisation.⁹ This is an accurate account of the law, revealing how principles adapt to new and different circumstances, but in this scenario, the lawh as been expanded based on contemporary meaningso ft he words "specimen" and "body."¹⁰ But these are fabled, for "sample" (in the sense of a "specimen" usedt ot est for illness, or genes and so on) was not contemplated in the case. It concerned a corpse,¹¹ meaning anyreferencetoaspecimen related to "anatomical and pathological specimens or preparations formed and maintainedbyscientific bodies."¹² And finally aset of crib notes,a vailable for sale on the internet to lawstudents.
They do not start well, referring to "M," meaning mother.N om other was involved in this case. Ih aveu nderlined parts of the notes and the reason will become clear presently:
Mgavebirth to stillborn dual headed baby.Asurgeon took the bodyand preserved it,later sellingi ta ta na uction. Mt hen broughta na ction for recovery.
-Griffith CJ:Just because cannot own acorpseatdeath does not mean that it can never be owned. Ah uman bodyorp ortion of it is capable of becoming property; it is not necessary to give an exhaustive account of the circumstances in which this is the case but where ap erson has by lawful exercise of skill or workd ealtw ith the human bodys o that it is different he mayo wn it. -Barton J: Agreed with abovebut noted the gross indecency; also describesthe baby as a monster. -Higgins J: Dissented on basis that he thoughtt hat human beingc annot be owned, whether alive or dead.¹³
The crib notes are repletewith errors.But they also include afablingofaremark made by Barton J. He did not describe "the baby" as amonster.Heinstead characterized "it" in law as a "dead-born foetalm onster,"¹⁴ and as such not entitled to Christian burial. That there was ever alegal concept of monster is fabulous,¹⁵ obscuredbythe monster of popularculture. Monster is reframed as adescription without recourse to the legal concepts Barton J. relied upon, as is characterization of the baby as a "thing,"¹⁶ also al egal concept of property. If these three examples represent how the case is understood some 100 years after it was decided, how wasi tu nderstood in 1908?¹⁷ Iturn to the first lines of the headnote of the case that appears with the judgment.H eadnotes, which are written by selected lawyers, digest the keyp rinciples of ajudgment,which then end up beinga bstracted as the lawi tself:
A dead human body mayunder some circumstances become the subject of property. A corpse mayp ossess such peculiar attributes as to justify its preservation on scientific or other grounds,a nd, if ap erson has by the lawful exercise of work or skill so dealtw ith such a bodyi nh is lawful possession that it has acquireds ome attributes differentiatingi tf rom amerecorpsea waitingburial, he acquires aright to retain possession of it […] .¹⁸.(My emphases).
The headnote most closelyr epresents the thinking and reasoningc ontained in the majority judgment of Griffith C.J. Barton J. had "read the judgmento f the Chief Justice, and Ie ntirelya gree with the reasons it embodies, which I hold it unnecessary to amplify."¹⁹ And the italicized words?T hey barelya ppear in later accounts of the case, while those underlined have been abstracted as its principle, inevitablyfablingthe case and the lawitissaid to embody. But there is much, much more fabling to come concerning this case, and about it.
At wo-headedb aby
It is not hard to see how cases can be divorced from their time and space, or their founding story.The facts are anarrative of their founding story and are an important part of the lawinthe case. But the facts themselvesa lso fable. In this High Court case, as is standard at the highest appellatel evel, the facts are limited to the matters of lawunder consideration. Headnotes alsorecount the facts, briefly. Those in the 1908 headnote are very brief:
The subject matter of the action was the corpseofastill-born two-headed child, which the appellant had had in his possession for some years, and which had been taken from him by the respondent,anInspector of Police, on the occasion of aprosecution of the appellant for exhibitingt he bodyi np ublic. The facts sufficientlya ppear in the judgments hereunder.²⁰ Griffith C.J.'sa ccount of the facts narrates what is needed to make sense of the legal claim, in order to establish the right of possession of the property in the hands of Doodeward:
The subject matter of the action was the preserved bodyofwhat has been spoken of in the case as "atwo-headed baby." It appears from the evidencethat the mother of the baby gave birth to it in New Zealand forty years ago, that it was still-born (bywhich Iunderstand that it never had an independent existence), that the mother'sm edical attendant,aD r. Dona- hoe, who arrivedafter the birth, took the bodyawaywith him, preserved it with spirits in a bottle, and kept it in his surgery as acuriosity,that at his death in 1870 it was sold by auction with his other personale ffects and realized between £30 and £40,a nd that it afterwards came intot he possession of the appellant.I tm ust be assumedt hat Dr.D onahoe's possession of the bodyw as lawful, so far as the possession of such an object can be lawful.²¹ Barton J.'sa ccount consumed more thanapage, at irade about the "object," "thing,"" dead-born foetal monster,"" curiosity," one of "nature'sf reaks," as an encounter with an imaginary interlocutor who is asked to form amental picture negating anyp ossibility that the "object" might be human:
Howf ar would the critic consider his surprise justified or his lawa pplicable,upon further knowledge;upon learningwhat kind of "corpse" or "dead body" it is that his informant has been describing,and how far the object when seen conforms to the mental picturehehad formed of acorpsea waitingburial?[…]I th as been preserved in ajar or bottle with spirits sincethe dayofits birth, now forty years ago. Addtothese facts that it is an aberration of nature, havingtwo heads.Can such athingbe, without shock to the mind, associated with the notion of the process that we know as Christian burial?D oes it not almost seem indecent to associatet hat notion with such facts?²² These twoa ccounts could not be further apart,but their narrativesa re not random or accidental, with the Chief Justice establishing the basis under which the possessory rights of the appellant willb ee stablished, while Barton J. wants any later appellatec ourt to know that he confines his reasoningt oe xceptional situations.²³ It is unlikelyt hat the facts in the dissenting judgment of Higgins J. will be read, but if we do read his account,wer ead something very different, with very different nouns and verbs in play: a baby was born,t he corpse of a still-born two-headed child,t he birth took place in NewZ ealand in 1868;t he "medical man in attendancet ook the body away,a nd kept it in ab ottle till his death in 1870."²⁴ He alone notes that: "The medicalman in this case gotpossession of the corpse, and thereisnoevidence thatthe parents consented. But even the parents could not give him anyright to the corpse. It wasnot theirs to give."²⁵ While Griffith C.J. accepted the legality of Dr.D onahoe'sp ossession, Higgins J. questioned the fundamental basis on which the majorityd ecision rested, and there might have been good reason for his disquiet.
Obnoxious exhibitions
We have to go outside the judgment to find out why. No different from La Fontaine'st argeti nh is fable "The Wolf and the Lamb,"²⁶ the facts omit matters notorious to a1 908 public. On April 6, 1884,i nthet hen colonyo fN ew South Wales, aM r. Abraham Doodeward was prosecuted for exposing to public view an indecent exhibition at as ideshow at the Bathurst Show.T hese shows are held throughout Australia even now,amix of agricultural displaya nd funfare, whereA braham had displayeda n" obnoxious exhibition[ … ]o ft he nude body of at wo-headed femalei nfant,p reserved in spirits. The defendant said he had exhibited it for manyy ears in Sydney and New Zealand,²⁷ making ac harge for admission, and had never been interfered with before."²⁸ He was found guilty by the police magistrate under the vagrants act,and sentenced to three day'simprisonment (the act did not permit a "pecuniary penalty").²⁹ Nothing more was heard of Abraham until October 17,1 900 when "while addressingt he Grand Lodge session of Druids at the Oddfellows' Temple [… he] fell forward and expired."³⁰ His tragic demise was reported throughout the Australian colonies; af ew years later, the name "Doodeward" would captivateanew Australian nation for threey ears, all to do with the baby and its display.
In 1906,R euben Doodeward facedh is own criminalc hargesw hen he displayedthe baby,³¹ twenty-two years after his father'sprosecution. In his appearances before the magistrate and trial judge,the salacious and scandalous nature of the evidence meant that hundreds of reports of the case appeared throughout the country and in vast amounts of detail. The complaint on its own wasenough to whet their interest,that Reuben had "unlawfully, wickedlya nd scandalously exhibited to the sight and view of persons the naked dead bodyo fachild with two heads."³² No wonder the casew as notorious.
Reuben Isaac Doodeward was born in 1877.Some newspaper reports said he was ay oungm an, but he was nearlyt hirty at the time of the proceedings. He would have been nearlyt en at the time of his father'sp rosecution, but the evidence in the committal and criminaltrial revealed some odd and startling inconsistencies.This 1906 prosecution was triggered by the displayoft he baby at the Sydney Cricket Ground, duringapublicschools' sports carnival.Inthe tradition of the travelling show,the baby wasdisplayedinatent,and people weretempted to enter the tent through the inducements of at out,a nd ap lacard showing the baby.There weretwo moral panics on display: Reuben was inducingchildren away from ahealthyactivity,sport,and the effect of the displayonchildren. The children happilyl ined up oblivioust ot heir moral welfare, paying ap ennyt o enter the tent.³³
We have to remember that until the early1970s, one onlybecame an adultat twenty one; at wenty-year old was ac hild in law, as werey oung children. Apolice officer entered the tent and sawabodyofachild suspended by the arms by means of atape in some liquid in aglass case. He said to Reuben: "This is avery improper show to have here on the occasion of children'ssports,and if youcontinue to exhibit it probablyproceedings -will be taken against you."³⁴ He asked Reuben whereh eg ot it: "My father boughti ti nN ew Zealand from ad octor 20 years ago. He made aliving out of it,and Iintend to do the same."³⁵ In the committal proceedings, Reuben was pressed on these dates by the magistrate hearing the committal, Mr Macfarlane.The timeframeshad shifted. Reuben now said that he had known it to be exhibited for an umber of years in Bathurst,a bout twenty-threey ears before. The magistrate said: "Do yous tate that of your own knowledge?Reuben replied: "Well, not exactlyofmyown knowledge,but my father exhibited it in Bathurst.There was never anyobjectionr aised to my exhibiting it before the present case."³⁶ One of his brothers supported Reuben's statements.³⁷ The Bathurst newspaper that had reported on Abraham'sp rosecution was not going to let this stand, adding this to their report:
 "The Two-Headed Baby:D oodeward Bound Over,S ydney,T hursday," National Advocate Bathurst,F riday  November : .  "The Two-Headed Child. ShockingE xhibition," Singleton Argus NSW, Thursday  October : .  "ShockingE xhibition."  "ShockingE xhibition."  "ShockingE xhibition."  "ShockingE xhibition."
The Good Old Rule, the Catspaw and aT wo-Headed Baby It might be stated that in April, 1884,aman named Abraham Doodeward was proceeded against by SubI nspector Morris the Bathurst Police Court on ac harge of exhibiting an indecent representation. The offencec onsisted of exhibitingi natent on Bathurst Showground at wo-headed baby enclosed in aj ar,a nd Doodewardw as sentencedt ot hree days' imprisonment³⁸ There were otherdiscrepancies. Dr.P aton, the Government medicalofficer,s tated that the bodyw as that of am ale (not af emale) child which: "Hade vidently been kept in spirit for many, probably20y ears."³⁹ But by the time the civil case commenced in the New South Wales courts in 1907, the Doodeward'spossession had doubled. An arrative based in science was also starting to take hold, with Reuben remarking: "Ih aveh eard people sayt hat it was well worth looking at. In hearing children speakingo fi tInoticed that not one believed it was a child at all. One child passed the remark that it was made of putty."⁴⁰ Reuben was committed but at the trial changed his not guilty plea almost immediately, and was bound over to appear for sentencei fc alled upon, triggering the civil proceedings.Dr. Paton suggested that the baby should be handed to the Museum, and Sub-Inspector Spencea greed and took possession of it.R euben objected to both courses of action, and then applied for the baby'sr eturn, but Spence refusedt or eturn it without instructions. The baby was temporarily placed in the museum at Sydney University,a nd Reuben immediatelyt ook proceedings "with aview to recovering the monstrosity."⁴¹ The civil case thatended up in the HighCourt began on June, 20,1907asanaction against Spence in conversion and detinue; it was Spence in name only, for the case was proceeding under the auspices of the state Attorney-General. The statement of claim demandedt he return of "ac ertain jar,c ontaining ac ertain amount of chemical fluid, as ascientificexhibit,representing ababyw ith two heads," and damages of £400 in the District Court,⁴² whereRogers, D.C.J., non-suited him on the basis that there could be no property in abody. The case was appealedimmediatelyto the New South Wales Supreme Court,but was dismissed on November7 ,1907 . No facts were recorded in anyofthe threejudgments. The onlyfacts appeared in the headnote in the defence'sa rgument,w hich more or less are followed by Griffith C.J.⁴³
We alsof ind something else in the New South Wales report: "Appeal dismissed with costs up to the time of the appellant being allowed to proceed in forma pauperis."⁴⁴ Reuben was indigent and had costs waived.⁴⁵ Without the baby,h ei nevitably was unable to earn an income.⁴⁶ He was granted leave to appeal to the High Court on 20 December 1907; in January 1908: "The Chief Justice regarded the application as being in forma pauperis, and reduced the security for costs to £1."⁴⁷ The appeal was heard in May1 908, and the judgment delivered on July 31, 1908. It was allowed with costs and remitted to the District Court for trial. That seemed to be the end of it,but in September 1908 questions werea sked of the Attorney-General in the New South Wales Parliament: "Is it a fact that the Crown is appealing from the decision of the HighCourt of Australia to the Privy Counciland,ifso, what will be the probable cost of such appeal?Of what particularv alue, if any, is Doodeward'st wo-headed baby to the State of New South Wales?"⁴⁸ The state did appeal to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, the final appellatec ourt for Australia until the 1980s. It was based in London and was effectivelyaversion of the House of Lords, but Griffith C.J. and Barton J. werea lsom embers. In December 1908, it refused special leave to appeal in Spence vD oodeward.⁴⁹ This decision also meant that the remitted District Court decision stood. In November1 908,⁵⁰ am onth before the Privy Council decision, Reuben again soughtd amages or the return of the baby.N ew South Wales persisted. No law required the return of ac orpse, the object had no scientific value, the duty to bury the child now fell on the person in whose possession it happened to be, Spence. Judge Docker held thata st he specimen was the subjecto fa na ppeal  Doodeward vS pence (), .  Doodeward vS pence (), .  The losingside has to paythe costs the other side incurred in runningthe case. Not all costs arep aid.  His name appears in connection with completely different business ventures from inventing badgest oa dvertising.  "The Two-Headed Baby High Court ApplicationReduction of Security Allowed," The Sydney Morning Herald,F riday  January : .Apayment into court to covera ny potential costs awards against the appellant.  "The Two-Headed Baby," Evening News,S ydney, Wednesday  September : .  "Two-Headed Baby.R ight of Possession Upheld By Privy Council London Dec ." The Argus,M elbourne Thursday  December : .  "Two-Headed Baby Again.Return or £  sDamagesA warded." TheSydney Morning Herald,F riday  November : .
The Good Old Rule, the Catspaw and aT wo-Headed Baby to the Privy Council, the Crown should agree to av erdict against it,s ubjectt oa stayuntil the Privy Council decision.Itdid not accept this. Regardless, Docker J. applied the lawinthe High Court decision and awarded damages. He rejected a quantum of £37,t he price paid forty years earlier,a nd av alue based on its potential exhibition value of £137.Professor Welsh of Sydney Universityvalued it at about £2.H is Honor instead "fixed al iberal amount,£ 10 10s." The Crown demurred. "His Honor:Y ou want time to payt he judgment?M r. Piddington: No; we want time to know whether we ought to payt he judgment." The stayw as granted for af ortnight. ⁵¹ It seems as if Reuben took the money even though it was al ot less than the £400 he wanted. That was the lastt ime the baby was heard of in the newspapers,a tl east in connection with Reuben Doodeward.
Fabulous Judges
Most lawyers would have no idea about these postscripts to the High Court decision. That these oddities are lost is ameasure of the fabling of lawthat occurs over time. There is more to be come about the HighC ourt decision, but the Justices and their judging practicesa re also fabled by lawyers who imagine these founding justices of the HighCourt to be black-letter lawyers who draw on nothing but narrowf orms of legal reasoning when reachingt heir decisions. In 1910, aw ag calling himself "AB arrister" wrote as candalousp iece thatr ather scuppers this image:
The High Court does lovetoutter strangeaxioms,apothegms,dark sayings up on the harp, and the reports arestudded with such … plumsinadough of Law. Consider some preciosities,d rawn at random […] . Nor is the tribunal destituteo fh umor,o ft he "big wow wow" order,a swheni t( 3) observed in the classic Two Headed Baby case: "If the plaintiff is entitled to recover possession of this corpse, thereisnothingtohinder anyone from snatching the corpseo fsome eminent man, such as Napoleon, and keeping it in abottle, or usingi t for degrading purposes. As Hamlet says, "Whymay not imagination trace the noble dust of Alexander till he find it stoppingabung-hole.'" The Court will not stop at Shakespere [sic] , is indeed (4) amorous of the classics […]w hen Griffith, C.J.,makes his lambent swordplay with learning'stools it is (5) nothingunusual for the great Queenslander (discussingwhat "lawful possession" is) to quotew ith gusto such ancient piffle as -"The good old rule, the simple plan, That he should take whoh as the power, And he should keep, whoc an." (-Doodewardv .S pence.)⁵²  "Return or £  sD amagesA warded."  "The Lawand the Profits.N otesO nM ercantile And General Legalities. Speciallyw ritten for the "Evening News" by AB arrister," Evening News,S ydney, Tuesday  April : . -1920) t he first Prime Minister of Australia, resigned to become one of the three founding HighC ourt Justices. He remained on the bench until his death. Ac olonial politician,hewas also New South Wales Attorney-General. Sydney-born, Barton was abrilliant student,winning the £50 Lithgow scholarship and the Cooperscholarship. He graduated B.A. in 1868, and was asolicitorbefore being admitted to the Bari n1 871. He wasa ppointed to the Privy Councillor in 1901.⁵⁵ One thing may not be immediatelyapparent.Neither of these men had lawdegrees. Both undertook their laws tudies through articles of clerkship, because laww as not taught at universities at the time. Articles were an apprenticeship and exams sat on set areas of lawa sa pproved by the courts.T he University of Sydney LawS chool openedin1859toundertake these examinations; it onlybegan teaching lawthirty years later.⁵⁶ Articles weret he onlyo ption in Queensland.The Universityo f  Sir Samuel WGriffith GCMG., BA (Hons), MA., Hon LL.D (Qld)., HonLL.D (Wales)., QC available at http://www.sclqld.org.au/judicial-papers/judicial-profiles/profiles/swgriffith (last access July , ).  R. B. Joyce, "Griffith, Sir Samuel Walker ( -)," Australian Dictionaryo fB iography Vol. ,( MUP), .a vailable at http://adb.anu.edu.au/biography/griffith-sir-samuel-walker- (last access July , ).  Martha Rutledge, "Barton, Sir Edmund (Toby) ( -)" Australian Dictionaryo fB iography Vol. ,( MUP), .A vailable at http://adb.anu.edu.au/biography/barton-sir-edmundtoby- (last access July , ).  Sydney LawSchool: History.A vailable at http://sydney.edu.au/law/about/history.shtml (last access July , ).
The Good Old Rule, the Catspaw and aT wo-Headed Baby Melbourne opened Australia'sf irst laws chool in 1857.B y1 872, completingp art of its lawc ourse was compulsory for new lawyers.⁵⁷ Higgins J. was one of these new lawyers, and it was his words from the socalled TwoHeaded Baby case that "ABarrister" quoteda tl ength at (3). Born in Ireland in 1851,Higgins arrivedi nV ictoria in 1870,obtaining acommon schools teacher'sc ertificatea nd supporting himself tutoringt he children of the Melbourneelite. He had been schooledinIreland in the classics, and at the University of Melbourne "had an outstanding record[ … ]i nl anguages, logic, history, political economyand in Shakespeare."⁵⁸ Awarded his LL.B. in 1874,hewas admitted to the Victorian Bari n1 876. Also ac olonial politician, he served in both the Victorian colonial and the new Commonwealth Parliaments. Left-wing and progressive,h eb ecame Federal Attorney-General in 1904,a nd wasa ppointed to the HighC ourt in 1906.H iggins died in 1929 while still as ervingJ ustice of the High Court.⁵⁹ None of these brief pen portraits can do justice to anyofthese men, but one thing standsout: all three were schooled in the humanities before studying law. They shared agreater or lesserexpertise in the classics, and with Griffith'smathematics and natural science, and languages, and Higgins' logic, history and politics, languages and literature, they inevitablys hare foundational concepts and ideas, keytexts and concepts. It is alsohard to imagine that werenot affected in some wayb yt he 1662 Logic of Port-Royal,⁶⁰ for its influencer emained widespread until the end of the nineteenth century, appearinginten English editions, with the 1818 edition servingasatext at Cambridge and Oxford.⁶¹ Apopular 1850 translation by T.S. Baynes, Logic,o r, Thea rt of thinking: being the Port-Royal Logic,⁶² was written with studentsi nm ind and found its wayt ot he colonies, turning up in the list of items auctionedwhen aM r. Johnson'sl ibrary of philosophy, theologya nd politics wasp ut on sale in 1869i na dvanceo fh is return to  Melbourne LawS chool: Beginnings.A vailable at http://www.law.unimelb.edu.au/mel bourne-law-school/community/history/beginnings (last access July , ).  John Rickard, "Higgins,H enry Bournes ( -)"Australian Dictionaryo fB iography Vol. ,( MUP),  Available at http://adb.anu.edu.au/biography/higgins-henry-bournes- (last access July , ).  "Higgins,H enry Bournes ( -)"  Marett Leiboff "FabulousL aw".I ntroduction to this volume.  Buroker,J ill, "Port RoyalL ogic," TheS tanfordE ncyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall  Edition), EdwardN .Z alta (ed.), URL =< http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall/entries/portroyal-logic/>. (Last access April , ).  Antoine Arnauld and PierreN icole, Logic, or,T he art of thinking:b eing the Port-Royal logic, trans. Thomas Spencer Baynes (Edinburgh: Sutherland and Knox, ).
England.⁶³ Higgins, who studied logic,m ust have known of its methods, and its pervasive influencemeant that Griffith and Barton could not have avoided its influence. Though couched in formal legal method, the judgments of Griffith C.J. and Higgins J. recall the Logic as coded through Marin'sr eadingo f" The Wolf and The Lamb,"⁶⁴ and through theiri nvocation of fablesa nd their morality,we will see that through their reasoning,e ach evokes the reason of the strongest and the logic of the weak,⁶⁵ with inevitable results.
Fabling: The reason of the strongest is alwaysb est, redux
Af ew shorth ours after the HighC ourt delivered its judgment in Doodewardv Spence,S ydney's Evening News adorned its reportw ith this headline: "The TwoH eaded Baby.S upreme Court Judgment Upset.A' Twentieth Century Case.' The Mummy, The Skeleton and TheSkull."⁶⁶ Itsa uthor was able to speedilyfind the nub of each of the Chief Justice'sand Higgins'.judgments, represented in the headline. The headline is uncanny, cleverlyspeaking to each judgment, but once we read the judgments themselves, we find that something else is going on, that their reasoningr epresents the grammaticala nd discursive devices,a s accounted for in the earlier chapter in this collection, that Marin attributes to La Fontaine'sw olf (the Chief Justice) and lamb (Higgins J).⁶⁷ First to the Chief Justice. It is without question that the "great Queenslander" is af orceo fn ature and apowerful figure. Once we start readingt he Chief Justice'sj udgment,w er ealize just how his power is made manifest,a nd that is through the forceo fh is reason and logic. We are captivated and captured, acceptingits inerrancy however much we might want to demur.F romthe moment he observest hat "it does not follow from the mere fact that ah uman bodya t death is not the subject of ownership that it is forever incapable of having an  Listed at lot number : TheS ydney Morning Herald Friday  February : .  Leiboff, "Fabulous Law."  Edwin Patterson, "Logicinthe Law," University of Pennsylvania Law Review  ():  -.Heobserves that lawyers and judgesintuitively draw on "straight thinking" as formal logic: "The older treatises on logic, such as the "Port Royal Logic" of  regarded logicas"the art of properlyconductingone'sr eason in the knowledge of things," that is, the art of straight thinking" (citation omitted):;c oncluding that "The lawyer and the judge can, and ordinarilydo, reasoni nawayc onsistent with the rules of formal logic, without knowingt hose rules…" .  Evening News,( Sydney), (July , ), .  Leiboff, "Fabulous Law."
The Good Old Rule, the Catspaw and aT wo-Headed Baby owner,"⁶⁸ we are left in doubtt hat we must accept whatever comes next.W e quickly realize that the reason of the strongest is always best in order to vouchsafe the pre-eminence of rights of property in law. The small matter of the authorities or case lawthatmight stand against this position is swiftlydispensed with, on grounds no less than their fabulousness:
Manyd octrinesh aveb een asserted on the supposed authority of learned persons […]Id o not,myself, accept the dogma of the verbal inerrancy of ancient textwriters. Indeed, equally respectable authority,and of equal antiquity,may be citedfor establishingasamatter of lawthe reality of witchcraft.But in my opinion none of the authorities cited affordany assistancei nt he present case. We are, therefore, free to regardi ta sac ase of first instance arisingi nt he 20th century,a nd to decide it in accordancew ith general principles of law, which areu suallyi na ccord with reason and commons ense.⁶⁹ This is abreath-taking device. To cast this as acase of first instance in the twentieth century is as tunningm anoeuvre, its reason and logic the "faire" savoir of the wolf,⁷⁰ aviolent discursive act dispensing with the lawt om ake law, underscored by the little verse that AB arrister thoughtw as "piffle".⁷¹ Iw illr eturn to the verse presently. Griffith C.J. had to swiftlyd ispense with the possibility that the possession of the baby was unlawful, or at least questionable, doing so by speakingofpossession that "is not necessarilyunlawful" that shifts immediately to "possession which is lawful."⁷² The grammatical trick is stunning,f or it grounds aclaim to the baby thatisbasedinlawful possession. Such possession "connotes aright to invoke the lawfor its protection. Alawful possession which does not invoke anyr ight cognizable by lawi sacontradiction in terms. Otherwise there would be af ield of English laww heres till prevails: "The good old rule […] ."⁷³ Three uncitedl ines of poetry underscore and ground principles invoked beyond the limits of the law, from beyond the law, and as we will soon see, they have been purloined and verballed, for they mean something different entirely.
Another masterful stroke, for Griffith C.J. has somehow managed to convince us that Reuben'sr ights have been violated, regardless of how he and his father acquired the baby -or,i ndeed, how the doctor acquired it.R euben is now cast as the victim, the lamb,a gainst the wolf of the Crown, which seeks to acquire property through the naked power and without anyl awful basis through the terms of "the good old rule," in terms no different to that which characterized lawu nder the ancien régime targeted by La Fontaine.⁷⁴ That the Chief Justice is doing preciselyt he samet hing is obscured by through the grammaticalv iolence deployed. He knows thereissomething not quite right about the character of the possession, but he is determined to establish aprinciple basedinproperty nonetheless.
Surprisingly,h is motivesa re grounded in the discursive ethics of his new society,a nd with an eyet owards collections of scientific knowledge and the informationthey contain:⁷⁵ "If one medicalorscientificstudent maylawfullypossess it,hemay transfer the possession to another.Nor can the right of possession be limited to students."⁷⁶ Ergo,Reuben is not astudent,but he too can have the same right of possession. Griffith C.J.,though remembered as aconservative,was the champion of the worker when young. Even Reuben is able to holdproperty in the twentieth century in this new country.The concerns of the fabulists of oldHenryson and La Fontaine -are now remedied.⁷⁷ The reasoning is triumphantly egalitarian and diabolical in one for Griffith C.J. has establishedt hese rights on fabulous grounds.
It is incongruous, then, that acarefullycrafted general principle he included in the judgment has itself been fabled by latergenerations of lawyers, extending the principle to living bodies when he had carefullylimited his judgment to bodies from which life had been extinguished:
Ahuman bodyoraportion of ahuman body, is capable by lawofbecomingthe subject of property […] Ientertain no doubt that,whenaperson has by the lawful exercise of work or skill so dealtw ith ah uman bodyorp art of ah uman bodyi nh is lawful possession that it has acquired some attributes differentiatingi tf romamerec orpsea waitingb urial, he acquiresaright to retainp ossession of it,a tl east as against anyp erson not entitled to have it deliveredt oh im for the purpose of burial.⁷⁸ The latter part of the Evening News' headline is pure schlock-horror,p icking up the examples that Higgins J. used: the legal statusofamummy, skeletons and, of course, Yorick thatABarrister gleefullypicked up on in 1910.Higgins J. is looking backwards in time, as represented by this memento mori,a sw ell as forward in this judgment.Itechoes and respondstoChief Justice through logic and law. But "valuable to everybodyfor its great amount of useful and reliableinformation",itdealtvery thoroughlyw ith diverse subjects: in addition to the customary domestic and foreign news, it included weekly essays on literature,s cienceand invention.The "country" aspect of the journal was strongly emphasized in parliamentary reportsa nd commercial news,with essays on all phases of agriculture, articles on rural towns for the edification of city dwellers, and weeklyr eportsf romc orrespondents scatteredt hroughout the colony. ⁸⁵ Samuel Bennett died in 1878,b ut even after his death, the Journal continued his "deepa nd livelyi nteresti nb oth history and literature,s ubjects on which he wrotem anye ssays and reviews in his earlyy ears",⁸⁶ as ak ey publication in which Australian writers could be published.⁸⁷ Bryce notes thatt his was his best known publication and its "breadth and thoroughness which made it well respected in his time and lateravaluable sourcefor the studyofA ustralian social history".⁸⁸ He was alsothe publisherofthe somewhat differentlycoloured Evening News,o fw hich the Journal was ac ompanion publication.⁸⁹ A.B. or "Banjo" Paterson had been the editor of the Evening News (1904 -06), and then took over as the editor of the Journal (1907-8). Banjo Paterson might not mean anything to people outside Australia. He wrotethe poem that became Australia'sunofficial national anthem, "WaltzingMatilda",and created the imageof the mythicalA ustralian horseman in "The Man from SnowyR iver".H ewas also impeccablyconnected. Ar elative of Barton, A.B. Paterson was also as olicitor.⁹⁰ These webs of connection reveal everything as they do nothing.The swirlingcapital of shared discursive dispositions meant that the "good old rule" that remainedu ncitedi nt hese judgments did not need to be, because they were well-known in late colonial Australia. There was no need,j ust as La Fontaine com/view/./acref/../acref--e-,(last access November , ).  Merilyn J. Bryce, "Bennett,S amuel ( -)", Australian Dictionaryo fB iography,N ational Centreo fB iography, Australian National University,h ttp://adb.anu.edu.au/biography/ bennett-samuel-/text,p ublished first in hardcopy ,a ccessed online  November .  "Samuel Bennett"  "Australian Town and Country Journal"  "Samuel Bennett"  "Australian Town and Country Journal"; TheEvening News ranfrom  July  - March .  Clement Semmler, "Paterson, Andrew Barton (Banjo) ( -)", Australian Dictionary of Biography,N ational Centreo fB iography,A ustralian National University,h ttp://adb.anu.edu. au/biography/paterson-andrew-barton-banjo-/text,p ublished first in hardcopy ,( last access December , ).
The Good Old Rule, the Catspaw and aT wo-Headed Baby did not need to point to the subjecto fh is attention in in "The Wolf and the Lamb."⁹¹ Forthe article in the Journalisour clue to the "good old rule".These words do not need to be explained within the world of late colonial, earlyF ederation Australia. But they mean nothing to those of us born out of time,w ithout the benefit of this circulatings hared capital that meant theres eemed to be no need for anyexplanation or reference of these words as they appear in the judgment.They are left unnamed in the judgment,o ne ac all (in the Chief Justice's judgment), and an echo (in thato fH iggins' J).They need to be decoded and explained because there is nothing that tells us to what they refer.T oc ut to the chase: these are lines from an 1807W ordsworth poem, "Rob Roy'sG rave", and they point to the key siteo fd ispute in the judgmentso ft he Chief Justice and the dissenting Higgins J.
Though traceable to the Wordsworth poem, however,t he reference in the judgment is not identical with the poem itself, however.I fy ou look at the illustrateda rticle in which they appear in the Journal,you might notice threen umbered points. They comprise the form of words the Chief Justice used thatABarrister called "ancient piffle," and each appends to the "moving image" of the "storyboard" of the illustrations accompanying the little article (Fig. 1) .
The passagefrom the poem included in the piece in the Journal is cushioned by am odern, illustrated fable, completew ith animals, for Wordsworth was describing animal behaviour; eagles in the air and Rob Roy on the ground. But this is far from being the poem'sm oral. Rob Roy MacGregor( 1671-1734) was botho utlawa nd political hero, aH ighlander who demanded protection money from Lowlanders, aJ acobite rebel who helped poor tenant farmers against oppressive landowners.⁹² His legend was fanned by earlyn ineteenthcentury Romanticsa sachampion of liberty against might,j usticea gainst law as an agent of division in society,a nd rights of property as at ool of injustice.⁹³ It is amistake to read the poem as negatinglaw in favour of unbridled power,for through the figure of Rob Roy,Wordsworth has crafted aversion of the "The Wolf and The Lamb" invoking the sentiments of that much earlier Scot,H enryson:⁹⁴  Leiboff, "Fabulous Law."  Rob Roy ( -)h ttp://www.scotlandspeople.gov.uk/content/help/index.aspx?, (last access June , ).  Adam Potkay, Wordsworth'sE thics (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press ),  -.  Leiboff, "Fabulous Law."
